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Decision XXVI/15: Non-compliance with the Montreal Protocol by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Noting that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ratified the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer on 24 January 1995, the London and Copenhagen amendments to the Protocol on 17 June 1999, and the Montreal and Beijing Amendments on 13 December 2001, and is classified as a party operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Protocol,

Noting also that the Executive Committee has approved $22,905,529 from the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol in accordance with Article 10 of the Protocol to enable the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to achieve compliance with the Protocol,

  1. That annual consumption by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the controlled substances in Annex C, group I (hydrochlorofluorocarbons), of 90.6 ODP-tonnes for 2013 exceeds the party’s maximum allowable consumption of 78.0 ODP-tonnes for those controlled substances for that year and that the party was therefore in non‑compliance with the consumption control measures under the Protocol for hydrochlorofluorocarbons;
  2. That the annual production by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of hydrochlorofluorocarbons of 31.8 ODP-tonnes in 2013 exceeds the party’s maximum allowable production of 27.6 ODP-tonnes for those controlled substances for that year and that the party was therefore in non‑compliance with the production control measures under the Protocol for hydrochlorofluorocarbons;
  3. To note with appreciation the submission by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of a plan of action to ensure its return to compliance with the Protocol’s hydrochlorofluorocarbon consumption control measures in 2015 and production control measures in 2016;
  4. To note that under that plan of action, without prejudice to the operation of the financial mechanism of the Protocol, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea specifically commits itself:
    1. To reducing its consumption of hydrochlorofluorocarbons from 90.6 ODP-tonnes in 2013 to no greater than:
      1. (i) 80.0 ODP-tonnes in 2014;
      2. (ii) 70.16 ODP-tonnes in 2015, 2016 and 2017;
      3. (iii) Levels allowed under the Montreal Protocol in 2018 and subsequent years;
    2. To reducing its production of hydrochlorofluorocarbons from 31.8 ODP-tonnes in 2013 to no greater than:
      1. 29.0 ODP-tonnes in 2014;
      2. 27.6 ODP-tonnes in 2015;
      3. 24.84 ODP-tonnes in 2016 and 2017;
      4. Levels allowed under the Montreal Protocol in 2018 and subsequent years;
    3. To monitoring its system for licensing imports and exports of ozone-depleting substances;
  5. To urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to work with the relevant implementing agencies to implement its plan of action to phase out consumption and production of hydrochlorofluorocarbons;
  6. To closely monitor the progress of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with regard to the implementation of its plan of action and the phase-out of hydrochlorofluorocarbons. To the degree that the party is working towards and meeting the specific Protocol control measures it should continue to be treated in the same manner as a party in good standing. In that regard, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should continue to receive international assistance to enable it to meet those commitments in accordance with item A of the indicative list of measures that may be taken by the Meeting of the Parties in respect of non‑compliance;
  7. To caution the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in accordance with item B of the indicative list of measures that may be taken by the Meeting of the Parties in respect of non‑compliance, that, in the event that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea fails to return to compliance, the parties will consider measures consistent with item C of the indicative list of measures. Those measures may include the possibility of actions available under Article 4, such as ensuring that the supply of hydrochlochlorofluorocarbons that are the subject of non‑compliance is ceased so that exporting parties are not contributing to a continuing situation of non‑compliance;